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In a recent talk in the Netherlands, Saskia Sassen (2016) conceptualized 
the city as a frontier zone: a space where actors from different fields 
encounter each other and where established rules of engagement do not 
yet exist. Sassen did not romanticize this situation, acknowledging that 
struggle on the frontiers can lead to either “freedom or death.” However, 
she stressed the role of modest neighborhoods as spaces where, through a 
new constellation of actors, the powerless have the potential to directly 
confront dominant power and “make history.” In this chapter, we pick up 
this proposition and ask how such a novel constellation of actors can 
intervene in urban governance spaces to enable and create alternative 
urban futures. A significant aspect of this question is the institutional- 
regulatory context in which those new constellations are born.
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Department of Sociology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,  
Amsterdam, Netherlands
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In the last decades, government-provided, invited participatory spaces 
for public engagement create new instances of encounters among previ-
ously separate actors (Cornwall, 2004). Collaboration, partnership, and 
co-production are the policy catchwords used when discussing the divi-
sion of roles for stakeholders in these invited spaces. In Western welfare 
states, these participatory policies are increasingly embedded in the regu-
latory context of neoliberal urban and welfare policies, administrative 
decentralization, and neighborhood regeneration. State-initiated partici-
patory processes and their regulatory contexts produce both specific chal-
lenges and opportunities for enabling alternative urban processes.
The challenges are marked by co-optation, loss of autonomy, and 
exclusion and further disempowerment of the vulnerable (Lee, McQuarrie, 
& Walker, 2015; Purcell, 2008). From a governmentality perspective, the 
challenges include the recentralizing state power,1 responsibilization of 
the individual, the privileged access of already powerful actors, and cor-
roding channels of representation, legitimacy, and accountability (Kokx 
& Van Kempen, 2010; Swyngedouw, 2005; Taylor, 2007). As for the 
opportunities, participation is seen as a chance to bridge the gap between 
representative democracy and participatory democracy and to tackle the 
very problems of diminished legitimacy, accountability, and inequalities 
(Fung, 2009). It can also be exploited, as an existing neoliberal tech-
nique, to mobilize state actors for political projects (Ferguson, 2010; 
Fisker, 2016; Holloway, 2005; McGuirk & O’Neill, 2012). From the 
social movements perspective, the changes to political structures called 
for by participatory processes can be turned into political opportunities 
for transformation (Newman, Barnes, Sullivan, & Knops, 2004; Taylor, 
2007). For example, participation can be exploited to organize external 
resources for groups, create new alliances, and establish a power base for 
new, previously excluded actors (Taylor, 2007).
1 In particular, the governmentality perspective highlights the prevalence of the two simultaneous 
albeit contrasting processes of administrative decentralization and the recentralization of state con-
trol. The former is understood as the involvement of civil society and market actors in governance 
and/or devolving state functions to sub-national levels. The recentralization of political control 
manifests in the dominance of neoliberal discourse on appropriate individual and civic conduct 
and in the performance-driven institutionalized audit culture (see also Kokx & Van Kempen, 2010; 
Swyngedouw, 2005; Taylor, 2007).
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In light of these differing views on whether participatory spaces serve 
progressive action or merely act as instruments for neoliberal politics, 
empirical research is called for to provide contextualization and nuance 
to the practices and intentions in these spaces (see also Silver, Scott, & 
Kazepov, 2010; Thuesen & Rasmussen, 2015). Such research can reveal 
how and whether alternative urban processes are significantly different 
from existing urban processes. Such research should focus on “how 
participatory structures and political agency constitute each other” 
instead of looking at whether citizen initiatives are co-opted by partici-
patory structures (Kemp, Lebuhn, & Rattner, 2015, p. 704). Doing so 
would make it possible to find “cracks”—defined by Holloway (2010) 
as spaces and moments of alternative doings that push toward self- 
determination—within the system of dominant logic. Therefore, we 
take this latter analytical approach to cooperation and contestation in 
participatory governance spaces. To decipher the power dynamics in 
participatory government spaces, we apply Bourdieu’s relational per-
spective. Bourdieu’s attempt to reconcile the agency-structure duality is 
relevant to the relationship between political agency and wider partici-
patory and governance structures.
Our empirical case is situated in the district of Amsterdam East, in 
the Indische neighborhood, where we investigated the specific partici-
patory efforts and enabling strategies of a citizen group, the Meevaart 
Development Group (MDG). The group’s members are boundary 
spanners between local government and the citizenry, and they engage 
with and utilize the rhetoric of co-creation in their efforts to enable 
alternatives to the “business-as-usual” trajectories of participatory 
neighborhood governance. Empirical data were collected between 2014 
and 2016 through observing stakeholder meetings and conducting 
informal talks and interviews in the context of a larger ethnographic 
research. Secondary data consisted of policy documents and other 
neighborhood-related documents. In this chapter, we first discuss the 
Dutch national institutional and policy context then conceptualize 
participation as a Bourdieusian game, a field of power relations. We 
then analyze our case using this Bourdieusian framework in the particu-
lar institutional and policy context of the Indische neighborhood.
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 An Alternative to What?
The institutional-administrative context in which governance mecha-
nisms and urban policies are developed and implemented in the 
Netherlands reflects hybrid neoliberal steering: it is aimed at city com-
petitiveness but also based on egalitarian, social democratic principles 
that work against socio-spatial fragmentation (Kokx & Van Kempen, 
2010). The regulatory context of recent participation policies continues 
this tradition. Regulations are area based (Specht, 2012; Van Gent, 
Musterd, & Ostendorf, 2009) or territorial (De Wilde, 2015), with the 
state selecting specific disadvantaged neighborhoods as targets of policy 
implementation based on demographic, social, and economic criteria. 
This shows path dependency (see Brenner & Theodore, 2002) in that, 
since WWII, the central state has assumed responsibility for local service 
provisions (Uitermark, 2003). These are administered within a three-tier 
system of state, provinces, and municipalities and paired with a corporat-
ist negotiation culture based on compromise and cooperation (Uitermark, 
2003). Each tier has its own authority; however, since the lower tiers are 
not financially autonomous, they are subject to supervision and largely 
dependent on central state budgets (Zwaan, 2017), suggesting a hierar-
chical (vertical) relationship. Until 2014, Amsterdam had a fourth tier of 
sub-municipalities, each with its own city council and committee.
Urban policies aimed at the quality and quantity of post-War housing 
were introduced as early as the 1960s (Specht, 2012). With the inflow of 
Moroccan and Turkish low-income guest workers in the 1980s, policies 
focused on extending social housing. However, this focus ended in the 
1990s, with the introduction of the Big Cities Program (BCP; Grote 
Steden Beleid, GSB), the policy framework of urban restructuring in place 
from 1994 to 2009. This neighborhood-oriented social renewal plan was 
made part of a city-oriented national development strategy (Uitermark, 
2003). The BCP linked the weak market position and unfavorable socio-
economic indicators of some urban neighborhoods with the presence of 
low-income minority residents. Social mixing, increasing the percentage 
of owner-occupied houses with affluent households, was promoted as a 
way to improve the “livability” of these neighborhoods (MVROM, 
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1997). This process was aptly identified by some as state-led gentrifica-
tion (Smets & Sneep, 2017; Uitermark & Bosker, 2014; Uitermark, 
Duyvendak, & Kleinhans, 2007). Social housing corporations imple-
mented the policy by incrementally selling their stock of social housing 
on the free market. They also reported policy results upward to the state. 
In the later years of the BCP, the livability narrative took on a more social 
dimension and citizen participation became more prevalent in urban 
policymaking. The Ministry of Living, Neighborhoods, and Integration, 
established in 2007, launched the 40 Neighborhood Program, which 
labeled disadvantaged neighborhoods based on socioeconomic indica-
tors. The program allocated participation budgets to citizen initiatives 
that were expected to improve neighborhood livability.
A wide range of research shows that there were gaps between the aims 
and effects of urban restructuring policies (see Smets & Watt, 2017). For 
example, ethnic minorities were marginalized (Uitermark, 2003), and ten-
sions developed between ethnic and nonethnic Dutch (Uitermark et al., 
2007). Social mixing did not lead to integration (Smets & Sneep, 2017) 
because the complexities of social relations (Smets & Den Uyl, 2008) and 
neighborhoods’ socioeconomic structural problems (Van Gent et al., 2009) 
were both neglected. These “flagship” policies generally indicated political 
interests (Kokx & Van Kempen, 2010), as evidenced by their overt focus 
on results—either physical and thus visible (i.e., increased housing; Van 
Gent et al., 2009) or administrative (i.e., government reports).
Citizen mobilization was also part of a national welfare retrenchment 
and decentralization program initiated by the 2007 Social Support Act 
(SSA; Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning, WMO). This law emphasized 
responsibility and self-reliance and encouraged both vulnerable and more 
resilient individuals to participate in the informal care of others. 
Municipalities were to act as implementing bodies and to report results 
upward. In the second stage of the SSA, in 2015, three welfare domains—
work and income, care of the elderly and the chronically ill, and youth 
care—were decentralized to the municipal level. While the discursive 
emphasis was on customized provision and bringing providers closer to 
vulnerable citizens, this stage reflected a strong emphasis on effectiveness 
and cost efficiency: before decentralization, funds were reduced by more 
than 75% (Zwaan, 2017), coupled with the rhetoric of “do more with less” 
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(Trommel, 2014, translated from Dutch). Two lines of exclusion also 
occurred. First, the focus on results led to municipal preference for profes-
sionals as executors, instead of citizen organizations (De Wilde, Hurenkamp, 
& Tonkens, 2014; Van Ankeren, Tonkens, & Verhoeven, 2010). Second, 
participation was limited to public and social entrepreneurs and gentrifiers, 
and  excluded  the most vulnerable  (De Wilde et  al., 2014; Uitermark, 
2012; Verhoeven & Ham, 2010). It is in this national policy context 
wherein our case in the Indische neighborhood unfolds. Next, we intro-
duce how the case can be deciphered through a Bourdieusian lens.
 The Game of Participation
In a Bourdieusian reading, neoliberalism can be seen as a global doxa 
(Chopra, 2003), representing the  all-encompassing, taken-for-granted 
rules and values of the economic field. National states and the bureaucratic 
field are the core agents of imposing neoliberal market principles that colo-
nize, and thereby ignore and dismantle, social relations (Bourdieu & 
Farage, 1994). They also create complicit subjects by instilling those prin-
ciples in human activities (Wacquant, 2012). Thus, the state is a locus of 
symbolic power; it is ingrained with the principles of the widespread eco-
nomic field that unifies and colonizes different fields. This in turn recipro-
cally establishes relations of domination in social fields, which manifest in 
the reproduction of inequalities (Cronin, 1996). Accordingly, in the game 
of participation, we see the dismantling of “the social” and the favoring of 
the individual, the market, and the calculable, as well as the exclusion of 
the historically disadvantaged, who lack economic and cultural capital. 
Though this urban sociological perspective emphasizes the commodifica-
tion of the social, it is commensurate with the political economy perspec-
tive in that both condemn the fact that neoliberal policies liberate and 
uplift the strong at the top while they deepen inequalities, anxieties, and 
insecurity at the bottom (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Wacquant, 2012). 
Moreover, both views emphasize the historical, contextual embeddedness 
of neoliberal restructuring: “actually existing  neoliberalism” plays out in 
inherited institutional environments and in specific supranational, 
national, regional, and urban contexts (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).
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Yet, the Bourdieusian perspective creates new analytical openings on 
two grounds. First, a Bourdieusian perspective allows one to look beyond 
the scope of economic resources. With Bourdieu, the concept of capital is 
extended from an economic understanding to cultural and social under-
standings; capital becomes a resource or an advantage, like “aces in the 
game of cards” (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 724). As such, the concept extends to 
social relations and power struggles and also makes it possible to look at 
other types of resources that facilitate change. Second, Bourdieu’s concept 
of field and its interrelated concepts hold an analytical potential regarding 
political opportunities. The new constellation of various actors, organiza-
tions, and levels of government can be seen as a rhizome of intermingling 
fields of power relations with their own historically ingrained habitus. 
These actors now have to position themselves in the new common field in 
which collaboration and contestation take place against the background 
of policy implementation. This novel field is culturally heterogeneous, 
and consensual schemes of its doxa are less established and specified, 
which extends the scope of agentic capacity (Cronin, 1996). In contem-
porary governance, the rules of participation and local implementation 
are established on-the-go, by means of experimentation, in an era when 
political decision-making is increasingly dependent on linguistic coding 
and the mobilization of discourse (i.e., doxic) alliances (Swyngedouw, 
2005; Taylor, 2007). This analytical conceptualization of a new common 
field corresponds with Sassen’s city-as-frontier metaphor.
The city-as-frontier opens up because the contemporary state is not 
unified per se in the Bourdieusian sense, but is rather “porous [and] 
fragmented” (Fisker, 2016), “peopled and dispersed” (McGuirk & 
O’Neill, 2012), which makes it more susceptible to disruption. For 
example, creating organizational forms that are asymmetric to “capi-
talist forms” of organizing—forms that focus on relations between 
people instead of relations between things—can go “in-and-against-
and-beyond” established forms (Holloway, 2005, p. 40). Agents can 
transform the limiting nature of doxic language by making it 
explicit—which disrupts dominant  discourses—thereby allowing the 
unequal distribution of capital to be revealed and the valued types of 
capital to be revalued. Furthermore, state actors can be mobilized as 
agents of these disruptions (Fisker, 2016).
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Within this conceptual realm, we looked at the relationship between 
the MDG and the city district implementing neoliberal policies in 
Amsterdam East. We asked the following questions: what are the rules of 
the game (i.e., doxa)? What are the valued types of capital and how do 
citizens reveal, revalue, and appropriate them?
 Co-creating the Local Rules of the Game
The city of Amsterdam is renowned as being historically diverse, tolerant, 
and open, and doing things in its own particular way. The coexistence of 
economic and social liberalism is ingrained in the city’s administrative sys-
tem, in which the Indische neighborhood is embedded. The neighborhood 
is situated on the East side of the city center within the highway ring. It is a 
prime example of the disadvantaged, up-and-coming neighborhoods that 
have been the focus of both urban and participation policies in the 
Netherlands. The neighborhood was predominantly ethnic Dutch until the 
1970s, when Moroccan and Turkish immigrants began arriving. In recent 
years, the small neighborhood of about 41,000 residents has witnessed gen-
trification. Because it has been the target of all national urban renewal pro-
grams, the housing stock has been restructured and public spaces have been 
revitalized to attract business investments and to diversify the retail econ-
omy.  Hochstenbach (2015) identifies gentrification in the Indische 
neighborhood as marginal, meaning that the displacement of sitting, non-
gentrifier residents is slow, and thus gentrifiers and non-gentrifiers cohabi-
tate. Moreover, marginal gentrification suggests that incoming gentrifiers 
are typically low income groups themselves, who reject dominant suburban 
living and are more open to the diversity and affordability of inner city 
neighborhoods such as the Indische neighborhood.  As such, new resi-
dents  of the neighborhood include students and the creative class (see 
Boersma, Langen, & Smets, 2013), as well as social entrepreneurs. 
The MDG’s founders, Sander and Arvin,2 got actively engaged in the 
neighborhood because Arvin was a local resident. Both have accumulated 
considerable cultural, political, and social capital inside and outside of 
state institutions due to their careers as policymakers and civil servants at 
2 Both respondents were extensively interviewed during the fieldwork. The names are pseudonyms.
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various municipalities and educational institutions. They have consider-
able knowledge about the logics, practices, and stakes involved in local 
political and bureaucratic fields. Both are members of the GreenLeft 
Party, and Sander was a district council member in Rotterdam before 
becoming a volunteer and social entrepreneur in various urban projects. 
Sander and Arvin became active in the midst of polarizing national soci-
etal and political discourses at the beginning of the millennium, which 
they aimed to counter on the local level. Additionally, their accounts 
contain value propositions such as the self-determination and critical 
capacity of citizens, more direct forms of democracy and more horizontal 
government-citizen relationships. The duo saw an opportunity for local 
action in the advent of participatory policies.
When, in 2007, the neighborhood became a focus of the 40 
Neighborhood Program, participation budgets started to flow in. The 
city district put citizen participation, unemployment, and social cohesion 
on the agenda and created a think tank in which citizens (including 
Arvin) advised officials on the allocation of participation budgets. With 
the SSA, Amsterdam was now responsible for implementing various wel-
fare tasks in ways that best suited the city. In the Indische neighborhood, 
the privatization of welfare provisions a year before meant that many 
neighborhood centers had closed and welfare professionals and civil 
groups had been displaced, creating a vacuum in the local welfare land-
scape. In 2008, Arvin and Sander helped establish the Timorplein 
Community, a network of local social and public entrepreneurs who 
facilitated activities and discussions regarding citizens’ desires for their 
neighborhood. The aim was to forge social mobility by building solidar-
ity between the more affluent entrepreneurs and the more vulnerable in 
the neighborhood, which suggests that the initiative resonated with the 
policy doxa of social mixing.
In 2009, the Timorplein Community invited various local institutions, 
council members, and other municipal officials to a participation work-
shop (Azarhoosh & Mehlkopf, 2009). On this meeting, Sander and Arvin 
redefined the governmental catchword of social cohesion according to a 
community development principle: they focused on the positives—the 
potentials and ambitions that were already present in the neighborhood—
rather than on the neighborhood’s problems. They claimed space for wider 
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citizen participation by defining citizens’ roles as contributors to policy-
making rather than simply executors of the district’s agenda. Here, the 
discourse was turned around: if the municipality would pay attention to 
what citizens wanted, ask questions instead of imposing answers, pose chal-
lenges instead of defining problems, and let citizens organize themselves, 
hidden ambitions and potentials could be discovered. Citizens should be 
seen as local experts, as “capital in natura” (Azarhoosh & Mehlkopf, 2009, 
p. 50, translated from Dutch). In short, the workshop redefined the citi-
zens’ ambitions and potentials as an asset and participation as something 
born of the dynamic between these ambitions and potentials.
Moreover, the Timorplein Community inventoried all resources of 
both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in the neighbor-
hood as a means to reach these policy goals. They showed that the SSA’s 
focus on individual responsibilities and self-reliance could only make 
sense on the societal and community levels—as it had to do with connect-
ing the self-reliant and the non-self-reliant. They demonstrated that facili-
tating social connections could contribute to solving the problems around 
employment, education, and social cohesion, all focus areas of the think 
tank. This logic suggested that locally targeted participation budgets of 
the 40 Neighborhood Program and SSA budgets should be placed into a 
common pool of resources furthering neighborhood participation. Thus, 
they demanded that budgets, which were being thus far predominantly 
given to local institutions, be reorganized so that local initiatives are being 
more widely supported. In this sense, the local government would deliver 
funds (economic capital) to citizens’ initiatives, while local welfare orga-
nizations, housing corporations and more affluent entrepreneurs would 
deliver provisions in the form of facilitation, support, and buildings (eco-
nomic, social, and cultural capital). In this way, all could work together to 
further participation and social cohesion, which is based not only on 
social relations but on other types of capital as well. The workshop also 
evoked and worked with the sentiment of localism, advocating that all 
parties “of and for our neighborhood” should work together and combine 
resources. This strategy of not changing the policy language but turning 
around the doxa of what it represents created more room for citizens as 
potential co-producers in the field of participation.
The workshop’s interventions to the municipality’s agenda happened 
early enough, just as institutions were embarking on their new task of 
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policy implementation. While the change in discourse evoked some resis-
tance and chaos in institutional circles, it initiated the foundation of a 
new culture among neighborhood stakeholders, a culture that was then 
transplanted into communities around the Meevaart.
 Asymmetric Organizational Forms
The MDG began in 2010, when Sander and Arvin got the keys to the 
Meevaart neighborhood center. Because of the district’s trust in Sander 
and Arvin and its interest in developing run-down societal real estate, 
officials agreed to transfer management of the building to the citizens and 
kept sponsoring it with a yearly subsidy. The message was simple: the 
Meevaart building was to be exploited as a social experimental space for 
citizen initiatives.
The building’s management was provided by the participants of the 
educational course called Facilitation Management that the MDG’s 
board designed. The program took perpetually unemployed residents and 
arranged workfare benefits for them to better their chances of reintegrat-
ing into the labor market. Room scheduling was to be negotiated between 
the initiatives, which could use the rooms for free, while commercial 
users paid rent. This type of organizational structure can be seen as asym-
metric because it goes against conventional community center manage-
ment in which a welfare organization has a say in programming and thus 
sees citizens as users of welfare services. Instead, citizens were the primary 
producers in this alternative field (see Cornwall & Gaventa, 2000).
The Meevaart model was a success story for the city district. It became 
a pioneering model for citizen activities, a place where different groups 
could meet and arrange events and services: it was the “house of the neigh-
borhood,” as the 2012 SSA policy plan called initiatives based on the same 
model (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2012; translated from Dutch). Local 
institutions needed to show results in local participation, to which engag-
ing with local citizens and collecting information about what is happening 
in the neighborhood contributed considerably. Thus, by interacting with 
local initiators, they produced results showing that co-creation works.
Sander and Arvin recognized these new stakes of the institutional 
actors in the game of participation and that these new stakes changed the 
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relative power position of the stakeholders for the benefit of the citizenry. 
This made an uncompromising, activist approach possible, which war-
ranted the Meevaart’s autonomy and prevented co-optation by the dis-
trict. The MDG’s strategy was to prioritize the Meevaart’s autonomy over 
its survival. Sander said that whenever the district wanted to dictate how 
the center should be operated, they would put the keys on the table and 
say that the district could have the building back. He explained:
If you consider your organization important [in itself ], you are going to 
make compromises. Then your interest is the continuity of your organiza-
tion. (Sander)
No compromises were made that would lead to co-optation. For 
example, when the district asked for a detailed report on user groups and 
programming, the MDG noted that this was not budgeted in the subsidy 
agreement, so the municipality would have to extend the budget. Since 
then, no such report has been requested. These examples show that the 
policy of co-creation enabled the organization of an alternative, asym-
metric form of welfare. The fact that this form was based on codepen-
dence between stakeholders allowed for acts of micro-resistance that 
prevented co-optation and stretched the frame of negotiation.
In addition, knowing what the stakes in the participation game were 
for local government created space to disrupt the conventional distribu-
tion of capital on the field. Namely, the MDG realized that the more 
information public officials have about citizen initiatives in the neighbor-
hood, the more room they have to navigate within their own organiza-
tions, which in turn would benefit the initiatives. The MDG built 
“pockets of trust” (Keast, Mandell, Brown, & Woolcock, 2004) with 
various frontline workers, welfare professionals, public entrepreneurs, 
and key political figures who could provide information, material 
resources, or key contacts and act as agents of “discourse alliances” (see 
Swyngedouw, 2005; Taylor, 2007). The district official responsible for 
participation, for example, was in daily contact with Sander. The official 
lobbied for budgets and provided information about municipal interests 
and agendas so the MDG could strategically prepare for meetings.
Having a physical space contributed to the exponential accumulation 
and “match-and-mix” of both cultural and social capital by facilitating 
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contact among citizen groups. Since the global financial crisis produced 
several forms of societal displacements, members of this diverse neigh-
borhood, including recently unemployed individuals—from high- and 
low-income groups—social entrepreneurs, and people living on social 
allowance, all met at the center and discussed their plans. Civil servants, 
council members, and professionals were regularly invited there to meet 
with initiators, which fostered an image of citizens as managers and gov-
ernors of the neighborhood. The Meevaart became an alternative field in 
which individuals developed a habitus characterized by a can-do attitude, 
cosmopolitanism, and democratic discussion. There was time and mental 
space to work out differences and commonalities across distinct organiza-
tional, cultural, and social fields and to develop new forms of citizenship 
together (see Ghorashi, 2014).
What you see here is that people who come with suggestions have a feeling 
of co-ownership of the issues here and that is why they offer suggestions for 
a new order. No one comes with order proposals outside on the street, 
because they don’t feel that they own the street. The street is of the govern-
ment, of the police, of the civil guard, or of the street cleaner but not of 
them. Only, the point is that my tax money pays for the street. I am the 
overall client and the sponsor of everything here. Then why do I receive 
such a bad product? So, this building is where you go to commit to and 
discuss those types of issues… There’s space to do that here. (Sander)
The Meevaart communities grew organically and exponentially. The 
more people engaged in the Meevaart, the more initiatives wanted a phys-
ical space that facilitated their ambitions. The organizational construc-
tion of the Meevaart was attractive because they could freely determine 
their own activities and realize their own ideas without having to face 
bureaucracy. The MDG took on the role of strengthening the supply side 
of participation. They started sponsoring and facilitating various initia-
tives in the neighborhood, some that were started by traditionally 
excluded groups. In practice, this meant the MDG lent its organizational 
legal status to bottom-up initiatives and redistributed the subsidies (eco-
nomic capital) they gained. Financial-administrative and reporting 
responsibilities were not a barrier anymore, either. Sander started to nego-
tiate for the interests of initiatives. He also organized the acquisition of 
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additional municipal buildings to create more physical space. Arvin went 
fulltime into discovering the “hidden potential in the neighborhood.” 
Accumulation of cultural and social/political capital among citizens hap-
pened through his brokering contacts and negotiating information 
between institutional figures and initiators. This novel role division made 
the inclusion of various groups possible in the participation field.
However, it was obvious that only the serious parties—entrepreneurs 
and the higher educated—were the primary beneficiaries and players on 
the field of participation. Most initiators needed to prove themselves first; 
they had to accumulate considerable cultural and social capital before 
they could convert it to economic capital. There were some successful 
initiators from minorities, who were seen as positive examples of the 
social cohesion project in the neighborhood. However, they were seen 
more as individuals than as representatives of their traditional communi-
ties. As for other community members, accounts diverged. Some experi-
enced the Meevaart as a “warm nest” where they could realize themselves; 
others voiced financial concerns about their positions as volunteers. 
Despite such persisting inequalities, the citizen network was strong 
enough to make political demands.
 Further Infiltration
In 2012, the neighborhood communities came together as the Indische 
Neighborhood Communities to create a future agenda for the neighbor-
hood. They went to the streets with district officials and surveyed residents 
about their priorities and ambitions regarding the neighborhood. Residents’ 
responses fell into four topics: employment and work; communities; care; 
and space for activities. These were discussed during several fora and trans-
lated to concrete demands such as allowing initiatives and start-ups to take 
control of empty buildings. They published these demands in the Citizen’s 
Perspective (policy) Note (translated from Dutch). Emphasis was on the 
interdependence among stakeholders in the neighborhood, with frequent 
use of the catchword “co-creation,” which was popping up in municipal 
vision documents as well. The promise of more flexibility and less control 
by the central municipality coincided with the recentralization of district 
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government administration. This reorganization weakened the position 
of some state actors and created an opportunity for the citizenry.
In 2014, the decision-making authority of district councils was abol-
ished. Instead, new territorial committees were appointed at the district 
level, and these became the link between districts and the central munici-
pality. The committees were responsible for local implementation of 
municipal policy agendas, in line with budgets assigned by the central 
municipality. Committees were also to be the “eyes and ears” of neighbor-
hoods so that implementation could be adapted to local needs 
(Municipality of Amsterdam, 2014). The MDG, aware of the precarious 
situation of local politicians who had lost authority and the administra-
tive chaos the recentralization had caused, saw the committee for their 
area as an opportunity for citizens to have a bigger say in these develop-
ments and to get closer to the central administration.
On 9 March 2014, ten days before municipal elections, citizens invited 
the territorial committee candidates to an election debate in the Meevaart. 
Their agenda focused on the four priorities of the neighborhood, including 
the concrete executive proposals developed previously. Strategically, Arvin, 
as moderator, asked the candidates to debate the proposals until they 
achieved consensus on accepting or rejecting them. Clearly, ten days before 
the election, candidates could not afford to lose face with the citizens. Thus, 
they accepted the proposals and promised to lobby for them with the cen-
tral municipal government. The proposals were all about creating more jobs 
for vulnerable groups and tackling neighborhood poverty. They involved 
creating educational programs and experimenting with outsourcing certain 
governmental tasks to communities and neighborhood businesses instead 
of to local institutions, thereby creating space for ethnic and nonethnic 
local entrepreneurs. When looking at these achievements through the 
Bourdieusian lens, they led to the direct allocation of economic capital to, 
and the accumulation of cultural capital by citizen groups.
During the debate on care and welfare, all parties found themselves in 
a precarious situation. A new version of the SSA was going to be intro-
duced on 1 January 2015, whereby implementation would be decentral-
ized to the local level. This created a situation that would require 
experimentation: the implementation of new measures coupled with a 
novel constellation of actors. This new terrain created a common ground 
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for dialogue among local stakeholders, an even more humble attitude of 
local governmental actors and a notion of shared responsibility. “We do 
not know how things are going to play out, but we can only solve things 
together,” became a repetitive discourse in everyday interactions, thus 
creating even more space for citizens in policy implementation. 
The broad policy framework created gaps in local social service delivery 
that citizens were eager to fill. For example, they found a reference in the 
later SSA about “the right to challenge,” which meant that citizens could 
challenge the government with their own initiatives to do things better 
and differently. According to Sander, the MDG was the first to operation-
alize this aspect of the law, using it to take over youth work services in the 
neighborhood. This political momentum created several other opportuni-
ties for citizens to create and take over public services according to their 
own rules, and several of those changes showed up in district policy docu-
ments in 2014. One example is the Neighborhood Window (NW, trans-
lated from Dutch), which was part of an experimental program in societal 
outsourcing. This digital tool inventoried the fragmented participation 
support services in the neighborhood. Though the tool was funded by 
government subsidies, it made municipal and institutional support tools 
gradually obsolete and created jobs for some residents. At the time of the 
research, the project leaders lobbied for an NW monopoly, so budgets 
allocated for similar services would soon get invested in this initiative.
But there was also a particular moment during the debate that showed 
that some broader structural problems were being ignored by the MDG 
and that the doxa of the economic field was inherent in the neighbor-
hood. A black woman raised the topic of “systematic ethnic deportation” 
and gentrification in the neighborhood, in relation to poverty and work 
opportunities. It was clear that most participants did not even under-
stand what she was referring to; they found her opinion too radical and 
did not take her seriously. Her personal experience was rejected, and the 
discussion changed to existing discrimination within neighborhood 
boundaries. Arvin, as moderator, also marginalized her voice, which 
shows his inclination to reproduce the doxa. We ascribe this outcome to 
two factors. First,  the inflow of marginal gentrifiers into the neighbor-
hood was construed as something positive. The original intention of the 
MDG, and the community infrastructure they developed, was grounded 
 Z. Kovács et al.
149
on the idea of mobilizing those who were better-off to contribute to the 
social mobility of the less powerful. Neighborhood gentrification was 
thus welcomed (which Arvin confirmed in an interview) because it sup-
ported the idea of social mixing. Second, the overt focus on localism in 
development of the neighborhood created a myopia toward the conse-
quences of gentrification on a wider city scale. Paradoxically, the localism 
perspective thus wiped the greater socio-spatial inequalities caused by 
gentrification off the agenda, while it catalyzed a more just redistribution 
of capital in the neighborhood.
 Conclusion and Implications
In our search of enabling alternatives, we read this case of citizen initia-
tives in the Indische neighborhood against Bourdieu’s theory of practice. 
Applying Bourdieu’s lens allowed us to connect analysis with generative 
knowledge production and gain insights into the cracks of neoliberalism 
in this particular context. The MDG’s enabling strategies and their effects 
reflected a curious hybridity and blurring interplay between existing 
Dutch neoliberal policy regimes and political agency. The generation of 
alternative values and practices simultaneously undermined those regimes 
through collective action while it consolidated other elements of the 
regimes. In Bourdieusian terms, this field is alternative, albeit semiau-
tonomous. Alternative, because the rules of policy implementation are a 
subject of negotiation and only partly autonomous and because these 
policies were born and exist within the widespread field of neoliberalism 
and its operating rules.
We found that the state and bureaucratic fields are not only agents in 
imposing the neoliberal doxa in the particular urbanity of the Indische 
neighborhood; they can also be utilized to disrupt that very same doxa 
when opportunities arise. Active citizens in the neighborhood saw politi-
cal opportunities in both the policy discourse on participation and the 
bureaucratic structure of the decentralized policy field. The entry point for 
transformation were the broad policy frameworks formulated by the cen-
tral state, which left the local field of implementation free of strictly estab-
lished power relationships and rules regarding participation (see also 
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Beitel, 2013). The lack of well-defined implementation paths and the ini-
tial confusion of the local administration provided several political oppor-
tunities for citizens to become significant producers in the fields of 
participation and policy implementation. The vacuum in the local welfare 
landscape, the decentralization of welfare in the SSA policy framework, 
and the inflow of finances from the 40 Neighborhoods Program policy 
framework all contributed to this. Understanding the stakes for and the 
habitus of institutional parties in the game, coupled with smart timing of 
disruptive actions, was a crucial strategic tool for the MDG. Being the 
first to define the rules of the game of local participation, exploiting politi-
cal sensitivities and aversiveness to risks, and filling policy language with 
novel democratic values were techniques they used to make room for 
popular voices in policy implementation. The MDG also applied discur-
sive strategies to infiltrate the system and change the distribution of capi-
tal among stakeholders. They strategically used the slogans of collaboration 
and co-creation, which came directly from their critique of a policy that 
abandoned and responsibilized citizens, who were to contribute to welfare 
provision based on their own merits. Namely, the MDG appropriated the 
representation of the co-creation doxa for their own purposes: from citi-
zens’ responsibility to shared responsibility. This way, they enabled the 
mobilization of state institutions’ economic capital—policy funding and 
empty buildings—and cultural capital—information and other provi-
sions. Moreover, they enabled bottom-up community mobilization, cata-
lyzing the accumulation and cross-fertilization of local cultural and social 
capital that mainstreamed the popular voice. Local community building 
decreased polarisation because it triggered both a wider and more mature 
civic engagement in public issues, and a climate of openness to differ-
ences. In sum, the resulting community infrastructure allowed for a dem-
ocratic culture that could lead to an alternative urban future.
The cross-fertilization of this culture in which the less affluent assert 
themselves was established enough—as Sassen would say—to claim its 
place in local governance history. However, it is important to note that 
the informal initiatives at the Meevaart often had different motivations 
and goals from the MDG’s, such as focusing on day-to-day activities 
instead of administrative arrangements or questions of direct democ-
racy. In our view, the readiness of communities to participate in this 
neighborhood is a consequence of the dual presence of poverty and 
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unemployment together with a large creative, entrepreneurial class, both 
of which are effects of the financial crisis. Intentions are crucial here: it 
was the societal engagement and political intention of local entrepre-
neurs—gentrifiers—that made them enablers of a more democratic alter-
native, which disrupted existing neoliberal practices.
To increase socioeconomic mobility, the MDG applied a pragmatic 
approach of gradual, incremental “up-scaling” of income redistribution: 
they placed individuals from society’s edges into workfare and created 
space for others to earn livings by innovating local welfare as public and 
social entrepreneurs. Improving situation for marginalized people is a 
laborious process because converting cultural capital to economic capital 
is difficult and takes time (Bourdieu, 1986). Thus, change can only take 
place incrementally, over a long period. The MDG’s choice of generating 
social capital and bringing back the “social”—as a catalyst for mobiliza-
tion—came with the price of consolidating volunteerism as a neoliberal 
policy tool of welfare retrenchment within and beyond workfare (see 
Mayer, 2003; Muehlebach, 2012).
The MDG’s ideas were born in a time of Dutch societal polarization. 
The gentrification of the neighborhood that was instigated by the BCP was 
seen as an opportunity to counter polarizing discourses by building com-
munities across religious, ethnic, and class differences and focusing on 
local democracy. Aligning with the social mixing program of the BCP, the 
MDG focused on social cohesion. Building on the “in and for the neigh-
borhood” discourse made it possible to inventory, reorganize, and redis-
tribute resources among local stakeholders. However, it omitted a critical 
lens on neoliberal urban restructuration and the long-term effects of con-
tinuing displacement of low-income groups from an area that was already 
gentrifying (see Uitermark & Bosker, 2014). This particular finding in 
terms of emphasizing the local to the cost of the “global” is telling of how 
neoliberal policymaking and political agency may constitute each other.
Namely, because urban policies were territorialized, the political 
opportunities created were also territorial, creating a “lock-in” effect of 
transformation on the neighborhood scale. In this regard, it can be con-
cluded that the specific opportunities—“cracks” provided by neoliberal 
policies—have become a double-edged sword, causing a trade-off between 
enabling more democracy on the local level and widening socio-spatial 
inequalities on the wider level.
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Citizens’ actions after 2016 were beyond the scope of our research. 
However, one could speculate, for example, that citizens’ greater access to 
the central municipality, through the mediating role of the territorial 
committee, could hold further opportunities for mobilizing state actors 
on a wider city scale, which in turn might draw attention to inequalities 
caused by gentrification.
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